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Abstract
Over the last years, independent central banks were often criticized. Many critics felt that the fatal flaw of the current system lied in its independent nature. Some critics argued that the remedy to such problems was to replace independence with interdependence. Such a drastic measure is completely unnecessary. No more time should be lost discussing further the merits or the weaknesses of central bank independence. But taking central bank independence as a given, one should simply try to equip central bankers with the mandates, the tools, and the values best fitted to help them face future shocks. Deeper checks and balances with other institutions and the fair financing of investment by all economic agents, including startups and SMEs, are urgently necessary to head off financial crises that will inevitably arise in this era of growing wealth inequality, disruptive technologies and climate change.

Abstract
How to best describe and assess the result of a bailout process? The author argues that the power of inaction of banks while relevant, as argued by Cornelia Woll in her book, is not sufficient to characterize the result of a bailout process. As such result should encompass financial stability and business cycle considerations, the power of inaction of banks needs to be viewed in combination with the ability of authorities to learn in action and the quality of the legal and political process that accompanies such learning.

AbstractThe monetary policy framework of the Eurosystem has received considerable attention in recent years: there is a well‐established and rich literature on the price stability objective, as well as the two‐pillar strategy of the ECB. This is less the case for the regular monetary policy preparations and the decision‐making process. This article provides an insider's roadmap to the procedures to prepare monetary policy decisions by the Governing Council of the ECB. The architecture of the Eurosystem permits the processing and analysis of a vast amount of national and aggregate economic, financial and monetary data and assists the Governing Council in taking monetary policy decisions – and this each month. Our aim is to describe the role of a variety of committees and sub‐committees that prepare and support the monetary policy decision‐making process. A federal organization is at the heart of this process. At the top of the pyramid of information there is a two‐tiered committee structure with the Executive Board taking the lead in bringing together most of the economic, financial and monetary analyses, and the Governing Council utilizing that information, for its monthly economic and monetary analyses.

The ECB's monetary policy has received considerable attention in recent years. This is less the case, however, for its regular monetary policy preparation and decision-making process. This paper reviews how the factors usually considered as critical for the success of a central banking system and the federal nature of the Eurosystem are intertwined with its overall design and the functioning of its committee architecture. In particular, it examines the procedures for preparing monetary policy decisions and the role of the decision-making bodies and the committees therein. We suggest that technical committees, involving all national central banks (NCBs), usefully contribute to the regular processing of a vast amount of economic, financial and monetary data, as well as to the consensus building at the level of the Governing Council. A federal organisational structure, including a two-tier committee structure with the Executive Board taking the lead in preparing the monetary policy decisions and the Governing Council in charge of the decisions with collective responsibility for them, as well as committee work at the various hierarchical levels, contributes to the efficiency of the ECB's monetary policy decision-making, and thereby facilitates the maintenance of price stability in the euro area. A fully-fledged committee structure has also contributed to the smooth integration of non-euro area Member States into the Eurosystem's monetary policy decision-making process.

The ECB's monetary policy has received considerable attention in recent years. This is less the case, however, for its regular monetary policy preparation and decision-making process. This paper reviews how the factors usually considered as critical for the success of a central banking system and the federal nature of the Eurosystem are intertwined with its overall design and the functioning of its committee architecture. In particular, it examines the procedures for preparing monetary policy decisions and the role of the decision-making bodies and the committees therein. We suggest that technical committees, involving all national central banks (NCBs), usefully contribute to the regular processing of a vast amount of economic, financial and monetary data, as well as to the consensus building at the level of the Governing Council. A federal organisational structure, including a two-tier committee structure with the Executive Board taking the lead in preparing the monetary policy decisions and the Governing Council in charge of the decisions with collective responsibility for them, as well as committee work at the various hierarchical levels, contributes to the efficiency of the ECB's monetary policy decision-making, and thereby facilitates the maintenance of price stability in the euro area. A fully-fledged committee structure has also contributed to the smooth integration of non-euro area Member States into the Eurosystem's monetary policy decision-making process.

The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area is a symptom of policy failures and deficiencies in – among other things – fiscal policy coordination. The first nine years of the euro were not used effectively in order to improve public finances, while the Stability and Growth Pact was watered down. Spillovers from the financial and economic crisis compounded fiscal difficulties in the euro area, especially in certain member countries. This paper looks back at the history of fiscal policies and rules in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It makes proposals to strengthen fiscal policy governance that go well beyond the legislation set to be adopted in autumn 2011. The authors consider these additional governance measures to be essential for effective policy coordination and sound public finances in the future.